Language and reality: between meaning, reference and existence

The study of language cannot be conceived without reflecting on the relationship between meaning, reference, and existence. One of the fundamental questions posed by semantics is that of the relationship between linguistic expressions and the objects to which they refer. The notion of reference presupposes that language maintains a link with the external world, but this relationship is far from obvious. Should we consider that words designate real and objective entities, or are they the product of a mental and discursive construction?

The classical conception of reference rests on an objectivist postulate according to which words refer to elements of the world independently of language itself. Frege (1892) thus distinguishes between meaning (Sinn), which corresponds to how a term describes its referent, and denotation (Bedeutung), which designates the real object to which it refers. From this perspective, reference is a relationship between a linguistic sign and an existing reality. For example, when we say “Napoleon died on Saint Helena,” the proper name Napoleon refers to a very real historical individual. However, this model encounters difficulties when we consider fictional entities. Expressions like Santa Claus or Sherlock Holmes also seem to possess a referent, even though they are imaginary figures. To address this problem, some theorists, such as Searle (1972), have proposed broadening the definition of reference by incorporating the possibility of imaginary or alternative worlds, but this extension calls into question the supposed objectivity of the referent.

An alternative approach to the objectivist model rests on radical constructivism. According to this perspective, reference does not point to an external world, but to a mental and discursive construct. In other words, the world does not exist outside of language, but is shaped by it. This theory draws on work in the philosophy of language that shows that our perception of reality is conditioned by linguistic and cognitive frameworks. Lakoff (1987) illustrates this point by showing that mental categories vary from one language to another, thus influencing how speakers of a language perceive the world. Therefore, the meaning of a word depends not only on its referent, but also on how it is used in a given context.

However, this purely constructivist view also has its limitations. If we deny any independent existence of language, how can we explain the stability of references in everyday communication? The fact that most speakers recognize and understand unambiguously expressions such as the Eiffel Tower or water is liquid testifies to the existence of a relatively stable referential framework, shared within a linguistic community. Charolles and Schnedecker (1994) show that coreference, which allows us to link several expressions to the same referent in discourse, relies on cognitive and pragmatic mechanisms that ensure this stability. Reference thus seems to depend on a balance between discursive construction and grounding in an intersubjective reality.

The question of meaning is closely linked to that of reference. A referential approach to meaning considers that the meaning of a word is determined by the conditions under which it can be applied to an object in the world (Kleiber, 1997). For example, the word “horse” designates an animal with certain defined properties (quadruped, mammal, domesticated, etc.). This approach allows us to account for how words are used to describe objective realities, but it poses a problem in the case of polysemous or abstract terms. A word like “justice” does not have a single, tangible referent; its meaning depends on the context and the interpretations attributed to it.

Other approaches emphasize the dynamic nature of meaning. Rather than considering words to possess an intrinsic and stable meaning, they suggest that their significance is constructed through interaction with context and discursive usage. Thus, understanding an utterance relies not only on a direct correspondence between words and referents, but also on a process of interpretation that draws upon shared knowledge and cultural frameworks. Quine (1960) criticizes this conception of meaning as a fixed relationship between language and world, and insists that the interpretation of a term rests on a network of underlying beliefs and assumptions.

Another way to approach the problem is to distinguish between different levels of reference. Some linguists propose contrasting external reference, which refers to entities in the world, and internal reference, which designates objects within the discourse itself. For example, in a fictional narrative, the main character may be mentioned as a referent, but does not exist outside the narrative framework (Langacker, 1987). This distinction allows us to better understand how language constructs reality while maintaining a certain connection with an extralinguistic dimension.

In conclusion, the relationship between meaning, reference, and existence constitutes a major challenge for linguistics and the philosophy of language. Neither strict objectivism nor radical constructivism is sufficient to account for the complexity of the relationship between language and the world. The meaning of words cannot be reduced to a simple relation with an external referent, but neither can it be entirely detached from reality. It is in the tension between discursive construction and referential grounding that the dynamics of meaning and communication unfold.